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Chapter 221: A Necessary But Incomplete Revision of the
Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act
Erich Shiners
Code Sections Affected
Labor Code §§ 2699.3, 2699.5 (new); §§ 98.6, 2699 (amended); § 431
(repealed).
SB 1809 (Dunn); 2004 Stat. ch. 221 (Effective August 11, 2004).
I. INTRODUCTION
As a means of ensuring Labor Code enforcement during California's ongoing
budget crisis, the Legislature passed SB 796, the Labor Code Private Attorneys
General Act of 2004 (LCPAGA).' The Act allows employees to bring private
lawsuits against their employers for Labor Code violations.2 One of the first suits
brought under the LCPAGA, Edmund Umbrasas v. Amgen, Inc.,' demonstrated
the Act's broad scope. As reported in media sources, this class action suit filed on
behalf of Amgen's six thousand employees alleged five Labor Code violations.
Three of the allegations related to violations of workplace information posting
requirements The fourth allegation was the employer's failure to forward copies
of signed employment applications to the Labor Commissioner's office.6 Under
the Act, the employer faced steep penalties7 for violating these "relatively
obscure" Labor Code sections.8 Such potentially large penalty awards caused
considerable dismay among California's employers, 9 who worried about
1. See 2003 Cal. Stat. ch. 906, § 1 (adding CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 2698-99) (finding that, due to the state's
financial inability to adequately enforce the Labor Code, private assessment of civil penalties is necessary to
provide a "meaningful deterrent to unlawful conduct" by employers).
2. 3 MING W. CHIN, ET AL., CALIFORNIA PRACTICE GUIDE: EMPLOYMENT LITIGATION, Remedies §
17:760 (2003).
3. No. SC038844 (Cal. Super. Ct., Ventura County filed Mar. 4, 2004).
4. Morrison & Foerster, Complaint Filed under S.B. 796, Mar. 2004, at http://www.mofo.comnews/
cfm?ID= 1193 (last visited July 11, 2004) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
5. See id. (listing among plaintiffs' causes of action violations of CAL. LAB. CODE § 1102.8, requiring
prominent display of the Attorney General's whistleblower hotline phone number; CAL. LAB. CODE § 1183,
requiring posting of Industrial Welfare Commission Order; and CAL. LAB. CODE § 3550 requiring the name of
an employer's current workers' compensation carrier be posted "in a conspicuous location").
6. See id. (listing among plaintiffs' causes of action violation of CAL. LAB. CODE § 431, requiring
employers to file with the Labor Commissioner's office any employment application "which an employee is
required to sign").
7. See id. (asserting that because penalties are "assessed on a per-employee-per-pay-period basis,
liability could be very significant").
8. Id.
9. See California Chamber of Commerce, Chamber Fights for Changes to "Sue Your Boss" Law, at
http://www.calchamber.com/index.cfm?navid=566 (last visited July It, 2004)] (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review) (reporting that potential penalties in just nine suits brought under the Act total $336.1 million).
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potentially devastating lawsuits for minor Code violations.'" Consequently, to
alleviate employers' concerns, the Legislature passed Chapter 221, which
narrowed the Act's scope considerably." While Chapter 221 succeeds for the
most part in achieving its purpose, a few concerns remain for California's
employees and employers, as well as for the state's Labor and Workforce
Development Agency (LWDA).1
2
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004
The LCPAGA attempted to remedy the understaffing of California's labor
law enforcement agencies by granting employees the authority to bring civil
actions against their employers for Labor Code violations. 3 Fearing the state's
budget crisis would continue to prevent adequate Labor Code enforcement," the
Act's sponsors intended to guarantee "maximum compliance with state labor
laws in the underground economy and to ensure an effective disincentive for
employers to engage in unlawful and anticompetitive business practices."' 5 Thus,
10. See ASSEMBLY JUDICIARY COMMITrEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 1809, at 4-5 (June 22, 2004)
(noting opponents' assertions that under the Act "significant inadvertent violations could lead to astronomical
penalties"); see also Dale Kasler, Labor law was budget blocker. SACRAMENTO BEE, July 29, 2004, available at
http://www.sacbee.concontenttpolitics/ca/budgettstory/10172279p-11092867c.html (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review) (reporting a police officer brought suit to recover $54 he was allegedly owed for providing security on a movie
set while he was off-duty).
11. See Michael Pind, "Bounty hunter" Law May be Eased, SACRAMENTO BUS. J., May 28, 2004,
available at http://sacramento.bizjournals.comlsacramento/stories/2004/05/31/smallb4.html (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review) (reporting SB 1809's author, Senator Joseph Dunn, introduced the bill to prevent
"minor, almost frivolous, litigation" from being brought under the Act, thereby "mak[ing] sure it only applies to
the more serious claims").
12. The Labor and Workforce Development Agency, created in 2002, consists of the Agricultural Labor
Relations Board, the California Workforce Investment Board, the Department of Industrial Relations and the
Employment Development Department. Press Release, Governor Davis Creates Labor and Workforce
Development Agency, July 31, 2002, available at http://www.governor.ca.gov/state/govsitelgov-htm (on file
with the McGeorge Law Review).
13. CHIN, supra note 2; see Douglas A. Wickham, The Private Attorneys General Act of 2004: One of
California's Newest Laws Threatens to Flood Employers with Class Action Lawsuits when an Ounce of
Prevention Could Avoid Them, ASAP: THE LITTLER MENDELSON NEWSLETTER, Oct. 2003, available at
http://www.littler.com/nwsltr/asap-private-attomeys.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (concluding
that "because, in the Legislature's view, the Labor Commissioner's office is understaffed... employees should
be deputized as Private Attorney Generals to perform the duties of the Labor Commissioner").
14. See 2003 Cal. Stat. ch. 906, § l(c) (observing that state labor agency staffing levels "have, in
general, declined over the last decade" and predicting that they "are likely to fail to keep up with the growth of
the labor market in the future"); ASSEMBLY JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 796, at 4
(June 26, 2003) (asserting that civil penalties are "meaningless" when they cannot be enforced due to staffing
cuts).
15. Cf. 2003 Cal. Stat. ch. 906, § l(a) (stating "adequate financing of essential labor law enforcement
functions is necessary" to achieve these goals).
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under the Act, employees supplement the LWDA as Labor Code enforcers by
"deputizing" employees in the role of private attorney generals. 
6
Under the LCPAGA, an employee may bring a private civil action for Labor
Code violations committed against the employee by his or her employer.'7
Despite the Legislature's statements to the contrary,'8 the Act apparently does not
require the employee to demonstrate actual harm.' 9 Furthermore, the "aggrieved
employee" may file a civil action "on behalf of ... other current or former
employees against whom one or more of the alleged violations was committed. 2 °
Though the LCPAGA contains no specific class certification requirements,"
courts have allowed employees to file class action suits under the Act.
22
Nonetheless, because any potential class is limited to current or former
employees,23 the Act does not provide "for private prosecution on behalf of the
general public. 24 Finally, the Act prohibits an action when the LWDA is directly
pursuing enforcement against the employer "on the same facts and theories"
under the same "section(s) of the Labor Code."
The LCPAGA creates default civil penalties for all Labor Code sections that
do not explicitly specify them.26 Under the Act, employers are liable for a penalty
of one hundred dollars per aggrieved employee per pay period for the first violation
and two hundred dollars per aggrieved employee per pay period for each
subsequent violation.27 However, the aggrieved employee does not recover the full
penalty amount. Half of the penalty goes to the state's General Fund, twenty-five
16. See 2003 Cal. Stat. ch. 906, § l(d) (declaring civil penalties for Labor Code violations "may also be
assessed and collected by aggrieved employees" under LCPAGA); Nixon Peabody LLP, Bounty Hunting for
California Employers: The New "Labor Code Private Attorney General Act of 2004", EMPLOYMENT LAW
ALERT 1 (Feb. 2004) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (observing "all Labor Code provisions can now
apparently also be enforced by an individual employee").
17. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 2699(c) (West Supp. 2004) (defining "aggrieved employee" as "any person
who was employed by the alleged violator and against whom one or more of the alleged violations was
committed").
18. See ASSEMBLY JUDICIARY COMMITrEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 796, at 6 (June 26, 2003)
(asserting that "this bill would not permit private actions by persons who suffered no harm from the alleged
wrongful act").
19. Memorandum from the Civil Justice Association of California, to Members of the Assembly
Judiciary Committee 2 (June 15, 2004) [hereinafter CJAC Memorandum] (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review); Wickham, supra note 13, at 1.
20. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2699(f) (West Supp. 2004).
21. Nixon Peabody LLP, supra note 16, at 2.
22. See Jackson Lewis LLP, Bounty Hunters Take Aim at California Employers, June 10, 2004, at 2, at
http://www.jacksonlewis.comllegalupdates/article.cfm?aid=588 (last visited July 11, 2004) (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review) (describing a "recently filed class action" suit under the Act); Morrison & Foerster,
supra note 4 (noting that Umbrasas v. Amgen was pleaded "as both a class action and a representative action").
23. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2699(0 (West Supp. 2004).
24. ASSEMBLY JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 796, at 6 (June 26, 2003).
25. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2 699(g) (West Supp. 2004).
26. See id. § 2699(e) (establishing a uniform civil penalty for violation of "all provisions of this code
except those for which a civil penalty is specifically provided").
27. Id. § 2699(e)(2).
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percent goes to the LWDA for education, and only twenty-five percent is recovered
by the employee.5 In addition to the civil penalty, a prevailing employee (but not a
prevailing employer)29 may be awarded "reasonable attorney's fees and costs." '3
B. Support and Opposition
Supporters of the LCPAGA insisted the Act was necessary to ensure
enforcement of the Labor Code while the LWDA's resources remained strained by
California's budget woes.3' The California Labor Federation asserted the bill would
"attack the underground economy"3 2 that exists primarily in agriculture and the
garment industry.33 Other supporters asserted a need for blanket civil penalties
because only district attorneys could enforce those Labor Code provisions whose
violation was punishable as a criminal misdemeanor. Allowing a civil penalty to
be assessed for them, they claimed, would prevent employers from "violat[ing] the
law with impunity."" Finally, supporters noted that with seventy-five percent of the
penalty recovered going to the state,36 the Act would provide much needed revenue
to both the General Fund and the LWDA.37
Not surprisingly, the LCPAGA was strongly opposed by California's
business community.3s The main issue raised by opponents was the Act's failure
28. Id. § 2699(h).
29. Nixon Peabody LLP, supra note 16, at 2; CJAC Memorandum, supra note 19, at 2; Maryann
Maloney, Commentary, Desperate to Save "Sue Your Boss," ORANGE COUNTY REG., June 29, 2004, available
at http://www.ocregister.com/ocr/2004/06/29/sections/commentary/orange-grove/artice_150378 (on file with
the McGeorge Law Review); see ASSEMBLY JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 796, at 6-7
(June 26, 2003) (noting California Chamber of Commerce's contention that not awarding attorneys' fees to
employers will result in "meritless claims" clogging "already overburdened courts").
30. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2699(f) (West Supp. 2004).
31. See ASSEMBLY JUDICIARY COMMIrEE, COMMrIrEE ANALYSIS OF SB 796, at 4 (June 26, 2003)
(claiming the "state budget shortfall calls for a creative solution" to enforcing labor laws); CALIFORNIA LABOR
FEDERATION, 2003 LEGISLATIVE AGENDA FOR LABOR, at http://www.calaborfed.org/issues-politics
leg.agenda.html (last visited July 11, 2004) [hereinafter CLF AGENDA] (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review) ("There must be a way to enforce labor laws without further relying on state resources.").
32. ASSEMBLY JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 796, at 3 (June 26, 2003).
33. See id. at 5 (stating LWDA "does not have the resources to pursue all of the violations in the
garment industry, agriculture, and other industries").
34. Id. at 3-4.
35. Id.
36. See supra Part I.A. (discussing the distribution of recovered civil penalties under § 2699(h)).
37. ASSEMBLY JUDICIARY COMMITrEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 796, at 4 (June 26, 2003) ("SB
796 helps generate revenues to the state at a time when we need them."); CLF AGENDA, supra note 31 (noting
SB 796 would "enhance needed revenue to our State").
38. See ASSEMBLY JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 796, at 10 (June 26, 2003)
(listing among the bill's registered opponents the Associated Builders and Contractors of California, the
California Chamber of Commerce, the California Manufacturers and Technology Association, the California
Motor Car Dealers Association, the California Restaurant Association, and the Orange County Business
Council); CJAC Memorandum, supra note 19, at 1 ("We continue to urge the Legislature to repeal Senate Bill
796... in its entirety."); California Chamber of Commerce, supra note 9 (urging members to contact their
Senate and Assembly representatives to ask for repeal of SB 796).
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to discourage frivolous lawsuits.39 Some critics compared the Act to the state's
Unfair Competition Law,4° asserting that it would encourage the same kind of
abuses by plaintiffs' attorneys.' In fact, plaintiffs' attorneys were the targets of
much of the criticism aimed at the Act. 2 This condemnation was rather
disingenuous on the part of employers' attorneys, however, because the Act also
benefited them, as well as other entrepreneurs, 3 by increasing employers' need
for their auditing, advising and representation services." Finally, opponents
claimed the Act would harm California's economy by increasing business costs,
leading to an exodus of businesses to more "employer friendly" states.
Though supporters dismissed most of these criticisms at the time, the need
for changes became obvious soon after the Act became effective. 6 In response to
39. See Maloney, supra note 29 (claiming personal injury lawyers "stand to make millions filing
frivolous lawsuits under [the Act]"); CALIFORNIA STATE SENATE REPUBLICAN CAUCUS, BRIEFING REPORT:
SUE YOUR Boss LAW (June 23, 2004), available at http://republican.sen.ca.gov/opeds/99/oped2280.asp (on file
with the McGeorge Law Review) (quoting Civil Justice Ass'n of California: "If enacted, SB 796 will expose
businesses to frivolous lawsuits."; see also California Chamber of Commerce, supra note 9 (asserting the "sue
your boss" bill, SB 796, makes "lawsuit abuse" possible).
40. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (West 1997) (defining "unfair competition" as "any unlawful,
unfair or fraudulent business act or practice"). Before the LCPAGA, courts allowed private suits for Labor Code
violations to be brought under § 17200. E.g., Bureerong v. Uvawas, 922 F. Supp. 1450 (C.D. Cal. 1996)
(holding garment workers' complaint alleging violations of California Labor Code was sufficient for claim
under § 17200); United Farm Workers v. Dutra Farms, 83 Cal. App. 4th 1146, 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 251 (2000)
(holding farm workers' claim that employer bribed them to influence other employees regarding union
representation supported liability under § 17200).
41. Maloney, supra note 29; see ASSEMBLY JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 796,
at 6 (June 26, 2003) (stating "[o]pponents liken the danger of [SB 796] to the recent abuse of the UCL by the
Trevor Law Group"). The Trevor Law Group filed over 3,200 "shakedown" lawsuits under the UCL. Rather
than face disbarment, the firm's three principals voluntarily resigned from the California bar on July 10, 2003.
Walter Olson, The Shakedown State, WALL ST. J., July 22, 2003, available at http://www.manhattan-
institute.org/html/_wsj-shakedown_state.htm (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); but see ASSEMBLY
JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 796, at 6 (June 26, 2003) (noting the Act's drafters
"have attempted to craft a private right of action that will not be subject to" the same abuses as the UCL).
42. ASSEMBLY JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 796, at 7 (June 26, 2003) (noting
California Chamber of Commerce's assertion that "SB 796 is an open invitation for bounty hunting attorneys");
Wickham, supra note 13, at 2-3 (claiming Act was political payback by the Legislature and Governor Davis for
campaign contributions by plaintiffs' trial lawyers); Maloney, supra note 29 (asserting the Act "lin[es] the
pockets of [the Legislature's] personal-injury lawyer friends at our expense").
43. See, e.g., California's "Sue Your Boss" Law, at http://www.sueyourboss.net (last visited July 11,
2004) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (offering employers an online guide to avoiding suits under the
Act).
44. See Wickham, supra note 13, at 5 (encouraging employers to conduct a "comprehensive statutory
compliance audit" with the assistance of "employment law counsel"); Jackson Lewis LLP, supra note 22, at 3
(urging the same, while noting "experienced employment counsel" can "guard against the discoverability of the
audit through litigation").
45. CJAC Memorandum, supra note 19, at 3 (claiming the Act "will increase costs to businesses of all
sizes"); CALIFORNIA STATE SENATE REPUBLICAN CAUCUS, supra note 39 (quoting Civil Justice Association of
California as stating the Act "will drive up costs to businesses and taxpayers, and further California's reputation
for having an unfair liability law system"); Maloney, supra note 29 (asserting that "the impact [of the Act] on
California jobs is disastrous").
46. See supra Part I (discussing the Amgen suit).
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these "frivolous" lawsuits, several bills to repeal 7 or amend"s the Act were
introduced in 2004. Of these, only SB 1809 made it out of committee.4 9 After
becoming part of the 2005 budget package, the bill easily passed both houses of
the Legislature. ° Since it contained an urgency clause,5' the bill took effect
immediately upon being chaptered by the Secretary of State as Chapter 221 on
August 11, 2004.52
III. CHAPTER 221
Chapter 221 adds three important provisions to the Labor Code Private
Attorneys General Act of 2004. Two of these are aimed at reducing the potential
for frivolous lawsuits under the Act,53 while the third attempts to reign in
potentially disproportionate penalty awards.M In addition to making several
47. AB 2181 (Campbell) (2004) (seeking complete repeal of the LCPAGA).
48. AB 2650 (Bates) (2004) (exempting businesses with fewer than 100 employees from the Act); SB
1809 (Dunn) (2004) (allowing courts discretion to award less than the statutory amount in LCPAGA actions
when warranted by specific circumstances and giving the LWDA exclusive authority to bring enforcement
actions for posting and notice violations); SB 1861 (Ashburn) (2004) (requiring an employee to notify the
LWDA of the alleged violation, then wait sixty days for the Agency to investigate or take action before filing a
civil suit under the Act).
49. AB 2181 (Campbell) (2004) failed to pass the Assembly Committee on Labor and Employment on
March 31 and April 21, 2004 and was then tabled per Joint Rule 62(a). AB 2650 (Bates) (2004) failed passage
in the same Assembly Committee on April 21, 2004 and never received a second committee vote. SB 1861
(Ashburn) (2004) failed to pass the Senate Committee on Labor and Industrial Relations on April 28, 2004.
Though the Committee granted reconsideration, SB 1861 never came up for another committee vote because its
notice provisions, in modified form, were incorporated into SB 1809 by a May 11, 2004 amendment.
50. During the summer of 2004, Republican legislators and the governor both sought repeal of the
LCPAGA as a condition of passing the 2005 budget. David M. Drucker, Budget Finally in Hand, L.A. DAILY
NEWS, July 27, 2004, available at http://www.dailynews.com/Stories/0,1413,200%257E20954%257E2296
781,00.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (noting that "Republicans - backed by [Govemor]
Schwarzenegger - had sought to repeal Senate Bill 796"). In an effort to prevent this, Democratic Senator Dunn
worked with Senate Republican leaders to modify SB 1809 so it would alleviate employers' concerns while still
providing protection to workers. See Marc Lifsher, Labor Litigation Law Is Revisited, L.A. TIMES, July 22,
2004, available at http://www.latimes.com/newslocal/politics/callafisue22jul22,1,6702182.story?coll-la-news
-politics-california (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (reporting Dunn and Senate Minority Leader Dick
Ackerman were "negotiating a possible middle ground that would be 'reasonable for business' and still give
workers protections for serious labor law violations"). On July 28, 2004, a substantially modified version of the
bill passed the Assembly; the following day it passed the Senate. On July 30, 2004, SB 1809 was enrolled and
sent to Governor Schwarzenegger. Because the governor neither signed nor vetoed the bill within 12 days after
receiving it, it became a statute on August 11, 2004. See CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 10(b)(3) (stating "[a]ny other
bill presented to the Governor that is not returned within 12 days becomes a statute").
51. See 2004 Cal. Stat. ch. 221, § 10 (as amended July 27, 2004) (stating "[tihis act is an urgency statute
necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, or safety.., and shall go into immediate
effect").
52. See CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 8(c)(3) (declaring "urgency statutes shall go into effect immediately upon
their enactment").
53. CAL. LAB. CODE § 26 9 9(g)(2) (enacted by Chapter 221); id. § 2699.3; see also supra note 14 (noting
author's view that prevention of frivolous lawsuits is the main purpose of SB 1809).
54. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2699(e)(2) (enacted by Chapter 221); see ASSEMBLY JUDICIARY COMMITTEE,
COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 1809, at 4-5 (June 22, 2004) (declaring "this bill addresses an issue.., that
significant inadvertent violations could lead to astronomical penalties").
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smaller changes to the Act, Chapter 221 modifies the Labor Code's retaliation
provision and repeals one of the Code's reporting requirements.
The most important of the new Chapter 221 provisions creates three
categories of Labor Code violations, each with different procedural requirements
that must be met before an employee may file a private action." Under the first
category, comprised of several dozen enumerated 6 "serious Labor Code
violations,"57 the employee must give written notice of the alleged violation to
both the LWDA and the employer. 8 The LWDA then has thirty-three days to
notify the parties whether it intends to investigate the violation. 9 If the Agency
decides not to investigate or timely notice of either decision is not given, the
employee may bring a civil action under the Act.60 Likewise, if the Agency
decides not to cite the violator or does not do so within 120 calendar days of the
notice of its decision to investigate, the employee may file a civil action.6' Thus,
an employee is only barred from bringing a private action if the LWDA notifies
the employer within thirty-three days of the employee's notice that it will
investigate the violation, and then cites the violator within 120 days after notice
is given.
The procedures for the second category of violations, relating to workplace
safety and health, 6' are similar. The employee must give written notice to the
Division of Occupational Safety and Health (DOSH) and the employer of the
alleged violation.63 If DOSH's subsequent investigation results in the violator
being cited, the employee may not bring a private action under the Act.6 If
DOSH does not issue a citation, the employee may challenge that decision in
superior court. 65 However, if the court then orders DOSH to issue a citation, the
employee's private action is barred.66 Finally, if DOSH does not investigate the
violation, the provisions governing the third category of violations apply.67
55. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2699.3 (enacted by Chapter 221).
56. See id. § 2699.5 (listing all of the Labor Code sections to which § 2699.3(a) applies).
57. See SENATE RULES COMMITTEE, FLOOR ANALYSIS OF SB 1809, at 2 (July 28, 2004) (discussing the
procedures of Labor Code section 2699.3(a)'s procedures under the heading "Serious Labor Code Violations").
58. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2699.3(a)(1) (enacted by Chapter 221).
59. Id. § 2699.3(a)(2)(B).
60. Id. § 2699.3(a)(2)(A).
61. Id. § 2699.3(a)(2)(B).
62. See id. § 2699.3(b) (applying to civil actions brought "under any provision of Division 5 other than
those listed in Section 2699.5"); SENATE RULES COMMITrEE, FLOOR ANALYSIS OF SB 1809, at 4 (July 28,
2004) (discussing the procedures of Labor Code section 2699.3(b) under the heading "Health and Safety (Cal-
OSHA) Violations").
63. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2699.3(b)(1 ) (enacted by Chapter 221).
64. Id. § 2699.3(b)(2)(A)(i).
65. Id. § 2699.3(b)(2)(A)(ii).
66. Id.
67. See id. § 2699.3(b)(2)(B) (stating that if DOSH "fails to inspect or investigate the alleged
violation.., the provisions of subdivision (c) shall apply to the determination of the alleged violation").
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This third category, consisting of violations of provisions not falling under
either of the other two categories, 6 s is subject to "notice and cure procedures., 69
Again, the employee must notify the LWDA and employer in writing of the
alleged violation. 70 The employer then has thirty-three days to "cure' 7' the
violation. 2 If the employer fails to do so, the employee may bring a private action
under the Act.73 If the employee disagrees that the violation is cured, the
employee may appeal to the Agency, which then has seventeen days to respond.74
If the Agency does not do so or decides the violation has not been cured, the
employee may proceed with a private action.75 If the Agency decides the
violation has been cured, the employee may challenge that decision in Superior
Court.76 Thus, in short, employers have a one-month "grace period" in which to
correct a violation in this category. However, presumably to prevent potential
abuse of these procedures by employers, an employer is limited to three "cures"
of the same violation within a twelve-month period.77
In contrast to the new procedural and administrative requirements, the other
two major Chapter 221 provisions are fairly straightforward. One bars private
actions under the Act for violations of "posting, notice, agency reporting or filing
requirements," except for those involving "mandatory payroll or workplace
injury reporting. 7' This provision applies retroactively to January 1, 2004, the
Act's effective date, and "affect[s] all applicable pending proceedings. 79 The
other provision gives state trial courts discretion to award less than the maximum
civil penalty when "based on the facts and circumstances of the particular case, to
do otherwise would result in an award that is unjust, arbitrary and oppressive, or
confiscatory."'°
Chapter 221 also makes several smaller changes to the Act. Instead of
splitting the state's penalty recovery between the General Fund and the LWDA, s'
68. See id. § 2699.3(c) (applying to civil actions alleging "a violation of any provision other than those
listed in Section 2699.5 or Division 5").
69. See SENATE RULES COMMITTEE, FLOOR ANALYSIS OF SB 1809, at 3 (July 28, 2004) (discussing the
procedures of section 2699.3(c) under the heading "Notice and Cure Procedures for Other Labor Code
Violations").
70. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2699.3(c)(1) (enacted by Chapter 221).
71. Id. § 2699(d) (defining "cure" as having "abat[ed] each violation alleged by any aggrieved
employee, [being] in compliance with the underlying statutes as specified in the notice required by this part, and
any aggrieved employee [having been] made whole").
72. Id. § 2699.3(c)(2)(A).
73. Id.
74. Id. § 2699.3(c)(3).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. § 2699.3(b)(2)(B).
78. Id. § 2 699(g)(2) (enacted by Chapter 221).
79. 2004 Cal. Stat. ch. 221, § 6(b)(1).
80. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2699(e)(2) (enacted by Chapter 221).
81. See supra note 28 and accompanying text (discussing the distribution of recovered civil penalties
under the original Act).
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the entire seventy-five percent state recovery now goes to the Agency for
"enforcement of labor laws and education of employers and employees about
their rights and responsibilities."82 This is a continuous appropriation intended "to
supplement and not supplant" the agency's existing funding.8 Chapter 221 also
provides for Superior Court review and approval of all settlement agreements
under the Act. 4 This provision is retroactive to January 1, 2004, and applies to all
currently pending proceedings. s5 Finally, Chapter 221 gives the LWDA authority
to craft regulations to implement the Act.
86
Though initially encompassing only modifications to the LCPAGA,87 the
final revision of SB 1809 expanded Chapter 221's scope to include two other
Labor Code sections.88 The first of these, Section 98.6, prohibits employer
retaliation against an employee or applicant who files an action with the Labor
Commissioner.89 Under the Chapter 221 amendment, an employee or applicant
who initiates any action or notice pursuant to the Act is also protected from
retaliation. 9° The second of these sections, Section 431, requiring employers to
file copies of all signed employment applications with the Labor Commissioner's
office,9' was repealed by Chapter 221.92
IV. ANALYSIS
A. How Chapter 221 "Fixes" the LCPAGA
1. Procedural and Administrative Requirements Before Filing Suit
One issue raised by the Act's opponents was the Act's lack of a provision
requiring an employee to exhaust administrative remedies before filing a civil
action.93 However, such a requirement likely was not included because it would
have contravened the Legislature's intent. The Act was designed to ease the
LWDA's enforcement burden by creating an alternative private action for Labor
Code violations.9" By forcing all private actions under the Act into the LWDA's
82. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2699(i) (amended by Chapter 221).
83. Id.
84. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2699(1) (enacted by Chapter 221).
85. 2004 Cal. Stat. ch. 221, § 6(b)(2).
86. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2699(n) (enacted by Chapter 221).
87. See SB 1809 (as amended May 26, 2004, but not enacted) (amending only CAL. LAB. CODE § 2699).
88. See SB 1809 (as amended July 27, 2004) (amending CAL. LAB. CODE § 98.6 and repealing § 431 in
addition to amending § 2699 and adding §§ 2699.3 & 2999.5).
89. CAL. LAB. CODE § 98.6 (West 2003).
90. CAL. LAB. CODE § 98.6 (amended by Chapter 221).
91. CAL. LAB. CODE § 431 (West 2003).
92. 2004 Cal. Stat. ch. 221, § 2.
93. E.g., Jackson Lewis LLP, supra note 22, at 2.
94. See 2003 Cal. Stat. ch. 906, § 1 (finding that, due to the LWDA's inadequate financing, private
assessment of civil penalties is necessary to provide a "meaningful deterrent to unlawful conduct" by
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adjudication system, an exhaustion requirement would exacerbate rather than
alleviate the LWDA's resource shortage.
Rather than requiring exhaustion, Chapter 221 adds procedural and
administrative requirements that must be met before an employee may file a
private action under the Act.95 Chapter 221 requires an employee to give the
appropriate LWDA entity and the employer written notice of the alleged
violation.96 For "serious" or health and safety violations, the employee must then
wait a specified period for the LWDA to notify the employee whether it will act
on the alleged violation; the Agency then has another specified period in which
to do so.9 However, it is questionable whether giving the Agency "first shot" at
an enforcement action will lead to an increase in Agency actions. Because of the
Agency's resource shortage,98 it may be more likely to decline a case knowing
that a private party is pursuing enforcement. Moreover, if the Agency can collect
seventy-five percent of the recovery99 without expending any of its resources, it
will likely have little incentive to pursue any but the most important Labor Code
violations. Thus these new procedural requirements will not necessarily reduce
the number of private suits filed under the Act.
Additionally, these new procedures do not appear especially cost-effective
for employers. As noted above, it is probable many of the claims will end up as
private actions because of the LWDA's unwillingness or inability to pursue
enforcement actions, particularly if the Act results in more claims being filed.
However, even if the LWDA decides to take action on many of the violation
notices it receives, employers could still face significant expenses. In most
instances the Labor Code allows appeal of administrative decisions, including
dismissals,'0 to the state courts. '°' Furthermore, Chapter 221 allows an employee
to challenge in Superior Court DOSH's decision not to cite an employer for
employers); CHIN, supra note 2 ("The Legislature has found state labor law enforcement agencies unable to
prosecute every violation of the Labor Code, and that it is in the public interest to provide that civil penalties for
such violations be assessed and collected by aggrieved employees.").
95. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2699.3 (enacted by Chapter 221).
96. See supra Part I1. (discussing operation of Chapter 221 's notice and waiting period requirements).
97. Id.
98. See 2003 Cal. Stat. ch. 906, § 1(c) (discussing the decline of LWDA staffing levels relative to the
growth of the state's labor market).
99. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2699(i) (amended by Chapter 221).
100. See United Farm Workers v. ALRB, 74 Cal. App. 3d 347, 349, 141 Cal. Rptr. 437, 438 (1977)
(declaring Board's order dismissing complaint is final judgment for purposes of appeal). There is no case law
regarding whether an administrative agency's dismissal is a final judgment for appeal purposes under other
Labor Code sections. Cf 9 B.E. WrKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Appeal § 75 (3d ed. 1985) ("Orders of
dismissal [by a trial court] ... have the effect of final judgments in terminating an action and are appealable as
final judgments.").
101. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 98.1(a) (West 2003) (requiring Labor Commissioner to notify parties
of their right to appeal decision); id. § 1160.8 (allowing person aggrieved by final order of Agricultural Labor
Relations Board to obtain review of order in California Court of Appeal); see also id. § 6627 (allowing any
person affected by decision of Occupational Safety & Health Appeals Board to apply for writ of mandate in
California Superior Court).
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alleged health and safety violations.' 2 If an employee pursues either of these
courses, an employer may ultimately pay just as much to defend the
administrative action as it would have spent to defend against the employee's
private suit.
Chapter 221's "notice and cure" procedures, on the other hand, probably will
effectively reduce litigation for less serious Labor Code violations. When
alleging such violations, an employee must give the employer thirty-three days
after the notice to "cure" the violation. 3 Since presumably the violations that
trigger these procedures are easily cured, '°4 in most cases the claim will end there.
However, Chapter 221 does allow appeal of whether the violation has been
cured, first to the LWDA, then to the Superior Court."5 Additionally there is the
danger that the resource-scarce LWDA'O° will fail to respond to the employee's
appeal regarding the cure, thereby allowing the employee to move forward with a
private action. °7 Finally, because employers are only allowed three cures per year
for the same violation,' °8 consistent violators may face similarly recurring private
actions. On balance, though, these latter situations will likely be the exception
rather than the rule given the relatively minor nature of the violations included in
this category.
In sum, Chapter 221's procedural and administrative requirements will
probably reduce the number of private suits brought under the Act for minor
Labor Code violations, but its effect on private enforcement of more serious
claims is difficult to ascertain. Arguably, the new penalty distribution scheme
will give the LWDA more money for enforcement actions.' °9 Thus in the future
the Agency may pursue more of those claims itself, making the Act merely a
temporary means of increasing LWDA funding. On the other hand, the success of
private suits could lead to a shift in Labor Code enforcement towards private
suits, resulting in further reductions in LWDA resources as enforcement is
"privatized." In practice, however, it is likely the Act will establish a balance
102. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2699.3(b)(2)(A)(ii) (enacted by Chapter 221).
103. Id. § 2699.3(c)(2)(A).
104. See SENATE RULES COMMITTEE, FLOOR ANALYSIS OF SB 1809, at 2, 4 (July 28, 2004) (titling the
violations enumerated in Labor Code section 2699.3(a) "Serious Labor Code Violations", those falling under
section 2699.3(b) "Health and Safety Violations" and those under section 2699.3(c) "Other Labor Code
Violations").
105. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2699.3(c)(3) (enacted by Chapter 221).
106. See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text (discussing the LWDA's resource shortage).
107. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 2699.3(c)(3) (enacted by Chapter 221) (allowing an employee to proceed
with a section 2699 civil action "if the agency fails to provide timely or any notification" regarding the
sufficiency of the cure).
108. Id. § 2699.3(c)(2)(B).
109. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 2699(i) (amended by Chapter 221) (earmarking seventy-five percent of
penalties recovered in private actions for the LWDA). However, the Act's penalty distribution formula does not
apply to cases settled out of court. See SENATE RULES COMMITTEE, FLOOR ANALYSIS OF SB 1809, at 7 (July
28, 2004) (reporting that because most LCPAGA cases have settled out of court, the LWDA has to date
received less than one hundred dollars from private suits under the Act).
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between public and private Labor Code enforcement, allowing the LWDA to
pick and choose which violations it wants to pursue without concern that others
will go unpunished.
2. No Private Action for Posting, Notice, Reporting or Filing Violations
Opponents also criticized the LCPAGA for allowing employees to bring suit
for minor Labor Code violations," ° including something as seemingly trivial as
the wrong font on a workplace poster."' The Act's failure to exclude such
violations, they claimed, would encourage "plaintiffs' attorneys, unions and/or
various activist groups [to] train employees to wander around the workplace
looking for missing posters.., in order to set up a civil action to collect penalties
and attorneys' fees."' 2 With four of its five claims alleging posting violations,"3
the Amgen case epitomized this particular concern.
To prevent such "frivolous" lawsuits," 4 Chapter 221 prohibits private actions
for "any violation of a posting, notice, agency reporting, or filing requirement"
except for those relating to payroll and workplace injury reporting.' The
provision may appear redundant in light of the new "notice and cure" procedures
targeting minor violations. ' 6 However, because those procedures allow a private
suit,"7 the Legislature properly included this provision to absolutely prevent
claims like those in the Amgen suit from being filed.
3. Court's Discretion to Reduce Civil Penalty
Another criticism leveled at the LCPAGA was that it allowed "excessive"
penalties for "minor and inadvertent" Labor Code violations."8 In particular,
opponents objected to the assessment of penalties on a per-employee, per-pay-
period basis. ' 9 Under this scheme, as one employers' law firm noted, an
110. Maloney, supra note 29 (contending that the Act "does nothing to stop an employee.., from filing
a civil lawsuit for tens of millions of dollars for the most minor violations"); Nixon Peabody LLP, supra note
16, at 2 (noting that under the Act an employee can sue for "even minor claimed Labor Code violations"); Pimi,
supra note 11 (reporting that the Act "spawned" lawsuits for "seemingly minor labor- and wage-code
violations, including the failure to post overtime and workers' compensation regulations").
111. Maloney, supra note 29.
112. Nixon Peabody LLP, supra note 16, at 2.
113. See supra Part I. (discussing the Amgen suit).
114. See Ping, supra note 11 (Senator Dunn is quoted as stating: "I want to make sure that minor, almost
frivolous, litigation is not the hallmark of SB 796.").
115. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2699(g)(2) (enacted by Chapter 221).
116. See supra note 104 (identifying categories of violations under Chapter 221).
117. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 2699.3(c)(2)(A) (enacted by Chapter 221) (allowing private action when
employer fails to cure violation); id. § 2699.3(c)(3) (allowing private action when LWIDA fails to respond
timely to employee's appeal of sufficiency of employer's cure).
118. ASSEMBLY JUDICIARY COMMrrrEE, COMMrTTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 796, at 7 (June 26, 2003).
119. CJAC Memorandum, supra note 19, at 2; Maloney, supra note 29; Morrison & Foerster, supra note
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inadvertent omission of required information from 250 employee pay stubs over
a six month period could result in $1.25 million in penalties.12 Because of such
potentially large recoveries, opponents claimed this method of penalty
assessment encouraged employees to delay filing suit in order to aggregate
penalties.'2'
Chapter 221 attempts to alleviate the concern over potentially excessive
penalties for minor violations' 2 by allowing trial courts to reduce the civil
penalty amount "based on the facts and circumstances of the particular case
[when] to do otherwise would result in an award that is unjust, arbitrary and
oppressive, or confiscatory.' 23 Ironically, during amendments, the Legislature
removed additional language from the provision that appeared to require a case-
by-case examination of the proportionality between the nature and scope of the
particular Labor Code violation and its statutory civil penalty.' 24 Such an
approach would have been consistent with that used to determine the appropriate
civil penalty amount for violations of the Act's close cousin, the Unfair
Competition Law,' 2' an approach that in practice often results in significant
reduction of civil penalties to avoid disproportionate results.' 26 By removing that
language, the Legislature appears to have abandoned proportionality consider-
ations for a scheme that gives the courts very little discretion to deviate from the
maximum statutory penalty. 27 However, this concern is mitigated by the
4; see ASSEMBLY JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 796, at 7 (June 26, 2003) (noting
California Employment Law Council's statement that "penalties could reach staggering amounts" under the
new penalty scheme).
120. Wickham, supra note 13, at 3.
121. CJAC Memorandum, supra note 19, at 2 (claiming the Act "creates an incentive to remain silent
about an alleged violation, and to lay in wait until the penalties add up"); Maloney, supra note 29 (using exact
same language as CJAC Memorandum).
122. ASSEMBLY JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 1809, at 4-5 (June 22, 2004)
("[T]his bill addresses an issue raised by opponents of [SB 796] who asserted that.., significant inadvertent
violations could lead to astronomical penalties.").
123. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2699(e)(2) (enacted by Chapter 221).
124. Compare SB 1809 (as amended on April 12, 2004, but not enacted) (amending Labor Code section
2699(d)(2) to allow downward departure when imposing the statutory maximum penalty "would result in an
unfair, arbitrary and oppressive, or confiscatory award, that is wholly disproportionate to any discernible and
legitimate legislative goal, and that demonstrably overbalances and outweighs the goals of punishment,
regulation, and deterrence") with CAL. LAB. CODE § 2699(e)(2) (enacted by Chapter 221).
125. Compare SB 1809 (as amended on April 12, 2004, but not enacted) with CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
§ 17206(b) (West Supp 2004) (requiring the court to consider "the nature and seriousness of the misconduct, the
number of violations, the persistence of the misconduct, the length of time over which the misconduct occurred,
the willfulness of the defendant's misconduct, and the defendant's assets, liabilities, and net worth" in
determining appropriate civil penalty amount).
126. See, e.g., People v. Beaumont Inv., Ltd., 111 Cal. App. 4th 102, 130-31, 3 Cal. Rptr. 3d 429, 452
(2003) (upholding trial court's assessment of $525,000 civil penalty on grounds imposition of full penalty of
over $35 million would "be so disproportionate to the illicit gains obtained by defendants as to constitute an
excessive fine").
127. See CJAC Memorandum, supra note 19, at 1 (stating "[w]e believe this convoluted language in
reality gives a court almost no discretion"); ASSEMBLY JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB
1809, at 6 (June 22, 2004) (noting California Manufacturers and Technology Association's claim that because
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exclusion of the most minor Labor Code violations from suits under the Act,' 28 as
well as by the "grace period" afforded employers to cure slightly more serious
violations. 29 Consequently, Chapter 221's strict standard for penalty deviation
probably will not have a large practical effect because the majority of cases
brought under the revised Act will be triggered by violations serious enough to
warrant the statutory penalty.
B. Issues Not Resolved by Chapter 221
1. Recovery of Attorneys' Fees by Prevailing Employee Only
Opponents strongly criticized the LCPAGA's allowance of attorney fee
recovery by prevailing employees but not by prevailing employers. 3 Allowing
prevailing employers to recover attorneys' fees, they argued, would provide a
"disincentive [for employees] to pursue meritless claims."' 3 ' Moreover, because
the attorney collects one hundred percent of the fees, even though seventy-five
percent of the recovered penalties go to the LWDA,3 2 critics claimed the Act
encourages attorneys to bring suits with small penalty recovery but high
attorneys' fees.'33 Consequently, opponents contended, the Act "announces an
open season" on California employers by "bounty hunting" attorneys.1
34
of the provision's "stringent" requirements for deviation from the statutory penalty, "any relief under this
provision by the court is highly unlikely").
128. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 2699(g)(2 ) (enacted by Chapter 221) (prohibiting private actions for "any
violation of a posting, notice, agency reporting, or filing requirement" except those relating to wages and
workplace safety).
129. See id. § 2699.3(c)(2)(A) (giving employer 33 days to cure violation); supra note 104 (discussing
categories of violations under Chapter 221).
130. PinA, supra note 11 (observing the business community's "outrage... that successful plaintiffs are
awarded attorneys fees and costs"); ASSEMBLY JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 796, at
6-7 (June 26, 2003) (noting California Chamber of Commerce's strong opposition to allowing recovery of
attorneys' fees); CJAC Memorandum, supra note 19, at 2 (stating that, while a plaintiff can recover attorneys'
fees, "an employer who wins a lawsuit cannot collect attorneys fees from the employee"); Maloney, supra note
29 (claiming that "under the 'sue your boss' bill lawyers can collect huge fees" while a prevailing employer
cannot recover attorneys' fees from an employee).
131. ASSEMBLY JUDICIARY COMMrI"EE, COMMITrEE ANALYSIS OF SB 796, at 6 (June 26, 2003); Nixon
Peabody LLP, supra note 16, at 2 (arguing that prohibiting attorneys' fee recovery by prevailing employers
does "little to discourage the filing of multiple claims for even the most minor of Labor Code violations")
132. See Wickham, supra note 13, at 3-4 (observing that "while aggrieved employees ... have to share
their recovery with the State .. ., the plaintiff's lawyers get to keep 100% of their fees.") (emphasis in original).
133. See Jackson Lewis LLP, supra note 22, at 2 (asserting the attorneys' fee recovery provision "is
likely to encourage plaintiffs' attorneys to pursue ... even minor or technical violations"); see also ASSEMBLY
JUDICIARY COMMITrEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 796, at 6 (June 26, 2003) (noting California Chamber of
Commerce's argument that the fee recovery provision subordinates the employee's recovery to the attorney's
fees).
134. Nixon Peabody LLP, supra note 16, at 1.
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The California Labor Code, contrary to assertions by the Act's supporters,'35
is inconsistent regarding whether prevailing employers can recover attorneys'
fees and costs. While some sections allow recovery only by prevailing em-
ployees, 36 others make no distinction between employers and employees as
prevailing parties.'37 Given this discrepancy, it is instructive to look at the
purpose and operation of fee shifting provisions under similar federal laws. Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which allows private plaintiffs to bring suits
to enforce antidiscrimination laws also enforceable by federal agencies,,8
contains a provision allowing recovery of attorneys' fees by a prevailing party. 3 9
In Christianburg Garment Co. v. EEOC,'4° the United States Supreme Court
found this provision serves two purposes. The first is to "make it easier for a
plaintiff of limited means to bring a meritorious suit,""' while the second is to
deter the bringing of "lawsuits without foundation.' ' 2 Like the Act's opponents,
the defendants in Christianburg argued that prevailing defendants should be
allowed fee recovery in all cases."'s The Court, citing the first purpose of the
provision, held that allowing such recovery would "undercut ... vigorous
enforcement of the provisions of Title VII."'44 However, in recognizing the
importance of the provision's second purpose, the Court also held defendants can
recover attorneys' fees when the plaintiffs suit is "frivolous, unreasonable, or
groundless.' 43
135. See ASSEMBLY JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMrITEE ANALYSIS OF SB 796, at 7 (June 26, 2003)
(noting supporters' argument that SB 796 "adopts the customary Labor Code approach that attorneys' fees are
limited to a prevailing employee").
136. E.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 1062(c) (West 2003) (allowing recovery of attorneys' fees by prevailing
employee in action under the Displaced Janitor Opportunity Act).
137. E.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 98.2(c) (West 2003) (allowing an award of attorneys' fees against a party
who "is unsuccessful in the appeal" of a decision by the Labor Commissioner to the Superior Court), construed
in Smith v. Rae-Venter Law Group, 29 Cal. 4th 345, 361, 58 P.3d 367, 378 (2002) (holding that by making no
distinction between employers and employees in Labor Code section 98.2(c), the Legislature intended to allow
attorneys' fee recovery by both). However, AB 233, enacted in 2003, overturned the Smith decision by adding
the following sentence to Labor Code section 98.2(c): "An employee is successful if the court awards an amount
greater than zero." 2003 Cal. Stat. ch. 93, § 2(c) (emphasis added). "It is the intent of the Legislature, in
enacting this act, to overturn the decision in Smith v. Rae-Venter Law Group (2002) 29 Cal. 0 345."). Id. § I.
138. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(f)(l) (West 2003) (allowing an aggrieved party to bring a civil action
for unlawful employment practice if neither the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission nor the Attorney
General brings suit against an alleged violator within 180 days of receiving the aggrieved party's charge).
139. Id. § 2000e-5(k).
140. 434 U.S. 412 (1978).
141. Id. at420.
142. id.
143. Compare id. at 418 (noting defendant's contention that prevailing defendant "should receive an
allowance of attorney's fees 'unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust') with CJAC
Memorandum, supra note 19, at 2 (criticizing SB 1809 for failing to amend the Act to allow prevailing
employers to recover attorneys' fees).
144. Christianburg, 434 U.S. at 422.
145. Id.
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The fee shifting provision in the LCPAGA is analogous to Title VII's
provision. The Act allows private actions for Labor Code violations as a means
of "ensuring maximum compliance with state labor laws.'"" Its fee shifting
provision makes it financially possible for employees, particularly in the lower
paid agricultural and garment sectors targeted by the Act, 1
4 to bring Suits. ' 48
Perhaps more importantly, it eliminates the possibility that a financially
devastating fee award could be assessed against employees when they lose.'
49
Accordingly, allowing prevailing employers to recover their attorneys' fees
would seriously undermine the Act's purpose by removing one of the main
incentives for employees to bring private actions under the Act.
The LCPAGA's fee shifting provision, however, does not provide for
sanctioning an employee who brings a "frivolous" claim. While existing
California law may be sufficient to deter such suits,'50 it might be preferable to
complete codification of Christianburg by expressly allowing an employer to
recover attorneys' fees when an employee's suit is found to be without merit. '
In doing so, the Legislature would preserve the provision's function of
encouraging private suits"' while allaying employers' fears of continually being
subjected to "frivolous" lawsuits.'5 3 Nonetheless, Chapter 221 fails to make any
changes to the Act's fee shifting provision.
2. Statute of Limitations and Retroactive Claims
Chapter 221 also fails to resolve two minor procedural issues that arose
under the original Act. First, some of the Act's critics expressed concern that it
146. 2003 Cal. Stat. ch. 906, § 1.
147. See ASSEMBLY JUDICIARY COMMITEE, COMMITrEE ANALYSIS OF SB 796, at 5 (June 26, 2003)
(noting LWDA's particular concern over the effect its resource limitations will have on Labor Code
enforcement in the garment industry and agriculture).
148. Cf Christianburg, 434 U.S. at 420 (describing one purpose of Title VII's fee shifting provision as
"mak[ing] it easier for a plaintiff of limited means to bring a meritorious suit").
149. Cf Harold J. Krent, Explaining One-way Fee Shifting, 79 VA. L. REV. 2039, 2040 (1993) (noting
that "under two-way fee shifting [where a prevailing defendant may recover attorneys' fees]... potential
litigants may be deterred from litigating by the prospect of paying their adversaries' fees").
150. See ASSEMBLY JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMIrEE ANALYSIS OF SB 796, at 7 (June 26, 2003)
("Supporters [of SB 7961 also note that current law provides sanctions for any frivolous filings."). Presumably
the Act's supporters were referring to California Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7, which allows trial
courts to impose sanctions on attorneys and/or parties when "legal contentions.., are [not] warranted by
existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the
establishment of new law" or when "factual contentions [do not] have evidentiary support or... are [not] likely
to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery." CAL. CIV.
PROC. CODE § 128.7 (West Supp. 2004)
151. See Christianburg, 434 U.S. at 422 (allowing a defendant in a Title VII action to recover attorneys'
fees when plaintiff's suit is "frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless").
152. Cf supra notes 148-51 and accompanying text (discussing purpose of Title VII fee shifting
provision).
153. See supra note 110 (describing opponents' fears of lawsuits based on minor Labor Code
violations).
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failed to impose a statute of limitations for private Labor Code violation claims. 54
This, like the penalty calculation scheme,'55 could encourage employees to delay
filing suit to aggregate penalties. Similarly, they noted that because the Act also
does not state whether penalties are assessable for violations that occurred before
January 1, 2004, 16 an employer could potentially be held liable for years of
violations. To date, California trial courts have interpreted the silence both ways,
allowing retroactive civil penalties under the Act in some cases but not others.'
5 7
Unfortunately Chapter 221 does not address either of these issues. Accordingly,
they remain potential issues for litigation, as well as sources of higher penalty
recovery, in cases brought under the Act.
V. CONCLUSION
Chapter 221 responds effectively to some of the criticisms leveled by
employers at the original LCPAGA. Together, the prohibition of private claims
for notice, posting, reporting, and filing violations and the "notice and cure"
procedures will greatly reduce, if not eliminate, private actions based on minor
Labor Code violations.'58 Should some of those claims make it through, the
courts' ability to award less than the maximum penalty will prevent excessive
awards against employers. 9 However, it is unclear how the new procedural and
administrative requirements will affect private actions for more serious Code
violations. The mandatory notice requirement and increased LWDA funding
through penalty recovery may result in the Agency pursuing more enforcement
actions itself.'" Conversely, they may induce the Agency to decline more
enforcement actions, leading to "privatization" of labor law enforcement with
resulting further reductions in LWDA resources.
6
1
Interestingly, Chapter 221 fails to address employers' biggest concern about
the Act, the recovery of attorneys' fees by prevailing employees but not
prevailing employers.' 62 While allowing employers to recover fees whenever they
154. See Wickham, supra note 13, at 4 (arguing that because the Act is a "penal statute" a one-year
statute of limitations should apply but predicting employees will argue for the three-year statute "applicable to
statutory violations").
155. See supra Part IV.A.3 (discussing criticism of the per-employee, per-pay-period penalty scheme).
156. Jackson Lewis LLP, supra note 22, at 3.
157. See id. (reporting one trial court "rejected an employer's argument the civil penalties only apply
prospectively" while another "granted an employer's request to strike the plaintiffs alleged retroactive civil
penalties").
158. See supra Part IV.A.2 (discussing the elimination of claims for posting, notice, reporting and filing
violations) and Part IW.A. 1. (discussing the "notice and cure" procedures for minor violations).
159. See supra Part IV.A.3 (discussing the trial courts' discretion to reduce penalty amounts).
160. See supra Part IV.A.1 (discussing the possible effects of the notice procedures for serious
violations).
161. Id.
162. See Pind, supra note II ("[W]hat outrages business advocates the most about SB 796 is that
successful plaintiffs are awarded attorneys fees and costs.").
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prevail would essentially eviscerate the Act, allowing it as a means of
sanctioning employees who file meritless claims would help alleviate employers'
concerns about repeatedly facing "frivolous" lawsuits. 163 Additionally, in failing
to state a specific statute of limitations or effective date for LCPAGA claims,
Chapter 221 leaves unresolved two issues that could result in significant costs to
employers through both higher penalties and additional litigation. 161 Yet, despite
its failure to take the rather simple actions necessary to eliminate these problems,
the Chapter 221 version of the Act more adequately balances the interests of
employees and employers than its predecessor. In practice, an equilibrium
between public and private enforcement actions will likely develop, leading to
more thorough enforcement of the Labor Code and thereby the fulfillment of the
Legislature's purpose in enacting the LCPAGA
6 1
163. See supra Part IV.B.1 (discussing implications of allowing only prevailing employees to recover
attorneys' fees).
164. See supra Part IV.B.2 (discussing Chapter 221's failure to address statute of limitations and
retroactive claims issues).
165. See 2003 Cal. Stat. ch. 906, § 1 (proclaiming Legislature's belief that to "achieve maximum
compliance with state labor laws ... and to ensure an effective disincentive for employers to engage in unlawful
and anticompetitive business practices," it is "in the public interest to provide that civil penalties ... be assessed
and collected by aggrieved employees").
